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From Behind Closed Doors to the Campaign Trail:
Race and Immigration in British Party Politics, 1945-1965
Nicole M. Chiarodo
ABSTRACT

Colored immigration from the New Commonwealth became a highly discussed
issue in British party politics immediately following the Second World War, but in an
effort to sustain Great Britain’s imperial status, to portray the nation as a new enlightened
force, and in reaction to the race issues taking hold in the American South, political elites
moved to keep their debates concealed from the public. In this thesis, I investigate the
positions of Labour and Conservative governments and the circumstances surrounding
the emergence of race and immigration into the public sphere. Moreover, I examine the
effects of its arrival. While the introduction of the British Nationality Act in 1948 by the
Labour government might suggest a progressive and tolerant party focused on equality
between all British subjects, and the restrictive legislation of 1962 indicates a
Conservative party focused on restrictive, racist policies, thorough examination of the
debates between the political elite and a clear understanding of the current state of affairs
offers a different story. Immediate postwar policies were formed in the interest of
shoring up empire, but as Britain began to move closer to Europe, realizing great power
status might be beyond its capabilities, the importance of empire waned. Resultant
discussions of restricting entry into Britain and increased racial tensions moved the

ii

debates from behind closed doors and into the public gaze. Party positions on the
immigration became evident in the 1964 general election. The issue once relegated to
private discussions between the political elite could now win or lose an election.

iii

INTRODUCTION

In the 1964 General Election in the small West Midlands town of Smethwick,
Shadow Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker was unseated by a young Conservative
school teacher by the name of Peter Griffiths. The fact that the Labour MP of almost
twenty years had been defeated in a year when national elections swung towards Labour
was only part of the story; it was the openly racist campaign led by Griffiths that grasped
the attention of party leaders and constituents alike. The issue was not the Conservative
school teacher’s position on immigration, but rather that it was used as his election
platform, thus discussed openly and, for the first time, made a prominent part of a general
election.
Politicians had been debating colored immigration since the end of the Second
World War, but in a bipartisan effort to sustain Great Britain’s imperial status, to portray
the nation as a new enlightened force, and in reaction to the race issues taking hold in the
American South, political elites moved to keep their debates concealed from the public.
With the British electorate becoming more aware of incidents abroad and increased racial
tensions at home, the issue had slowly been boiling over into the public gaze, but with
Griffith’s win against the incumbent it became suddenly clear that taking a stance on
immigration could be a vote getter- or loser.

1

Race had long been an issue in the British Empire. Fueled by commerce and
justified by Christianity and a civilizing mission, at its height British rule spread across a
quarter of the globe, presiding over one fifth of its diverse population. The nature of such
rule was adapted to local conditions; possessions were governed differently based on
their perceived capability for self-rule. Where the majority population was white, or
where the minority of white inhabitants were economically dominant, policies favored
progress towards self-government. For instance, the Gold Coast of Africa was under
authoritarian rule by British officials while Canada exercised the right to self-government
in all but foreign policy. 1 As the duke of Newcastle noted, responsible government was
“only applicable to colonists of the English race.” 2 Deemed uncivilized, colored people
were determined unprepared or even incapable of self-government and in need of British
guidance. With little to no regard for native culture and customs, Christian missionaries
believed it their humanitarian duty to spread European civilization and modernization to
those considered to be lesser peoples.
The racial attitudes that dictated rule abroad were duplicated back home. Britain
has always been a multi-cultural society, albeit the nineteenth-century cultures were
predicated mainly on class. With great disparity in British society, members of different
classes found little common ground. Gentlemen and manufactures, stockholders and
factory hands had little to not contact with one another. But as different as Britain’s
classes were, they did share a common understanding of the superiority of British
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civilization. 3 Bernard Porter argued that the arrogant belief that all peoples should
advance and be measured according to the British yardstick is based not on their
prejudices against these peoples, but rather on their understanding of their own nation’s
evolution. 4 British history dictated progress from savagery to civilization which the
middle classes applied to other cultures in order to explain their differences. 5 This shared
understanding of cultural supremacy was used to bind British society, as racial identity
served as a common denominator amongst British elites and working class alike,
providing a connection without need for reordering society. Their identity as AngloSaxons constructed to differentiate the English from the rest of Europe was now used to
separate them from the colonial ‘Other.’ 6 Thus, the idea that the British white man was
superior to the colored colonial bound British society together. The agricultural worker
may be inferior to the international banker, but he ranked above the native simply by
virtue of his Anglo-Saxon heritage, or Britishness.
Linda Colley suggests that British national identity was an invention forged
mainly by war. In repeated conflict with France from 1689 to 1815, Britons were forced
to confront an obviously hostile ‘Other’ against which they formed a collective identity. 7
As Peter Sahlins wrote, national identity “like ethnic or communal identity, is contingent
and relational: it is defined by the social or territorial boundaries drawn to distinguish the
collective self and to implicit negation, the other.’ 8 In short, we define ourselves by
whom or what we are not. First defining themselves as Protestants struggling for survival
3
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against a Catholic power, Britons later defined themselves “in contrast to the colonial
peoples they conquered, people who were manifestly alien in terms of culture, religion or
color.” 9 As the threat of militant Catholicism diminished, the ‘Other’ took shape in the
forms of a hostile Continental Europe and exotic overseas empire. 10
With the threat of danger gone after the Second World War and in face of
imperial decline, Britain was looking for a something new against which it could define
itself. The focus moved away from an imperial identity; the option of developing a “new
identity within a multiracial Commonwealth was being rejected in favor of more
traditional modes of belonging, rooted in myths of little England.” 11 Thus, Britons
looked within their own shores in search of a new identity, and, consequently to find a
new ‘Other.’ With colored immigration into the United Kingdom on the rise, it was to
the black immigrant that Britons turned.
The notion of what it meant, in a world-political sense, to be British had to
readjust and in that painful readjustment there developed a much more
exclusive concept of citizenship and a narrower vision of the kind of
society Britain could become. The narrowing of vision took many forms
and it is hardly surprising in a society with a long colonial history that a
redrawing of the emotional boundaries and images of nationhood would
for many people take distinctly racist forms. 12
By the Second World War there were an estimated 7,000 non-white residents,
mainly colonial seaman from the First World War, permanently settled in the port towns
of Liverpool and Cardiff, and in Manchester and London’s East End. 13 With the outbreak
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of war in 1939 the situation changed. Britain found herself in need of labor in the
munitions factories and services. Turning to her colonies, the government facilitated
migration to the United Kingdom. Over 10,000 West Indians were recruited to serve as
ground crew members in the Royal Air Force in Britain; thousands of colonial seamen
joined the merchant navy and a significant number of West Indians, Asians and Africans
served with the Allied forces. 14
But the British government never desired nor expected the non-white colonials
who came to Britain to support the war effort to stay. The Colonial Office anticipated
they would return to their place of origin as ‘good-will ambassadors,’ strengthening ties
between the mother country and her imperial subjects. However, working in Britain or
serving abroad with the Allied forces broadened the horizons of those devoting
themselves to the Allied cause. They saw opportunity in the United Kingdom. The work
they had done during the war was with great purpose; they were part of the national war
effort and well received by the British public. Colonial laborers were not faced with the
racial prejudice and discrimination in housing and employment experienced by colored
people settled in Britain before the war. However, though welcome to work and reside in
the United Kingdom in order to help the cause, it was never assumed that colored
individuals would set up permanent residence. Furthermore, British tolerance ended when
it came to relations between black men and white women. Any potential ‘darkening of
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the residents of the metropole’ was seen as repugnant. “Being British in Britain still
meant being white.” 15
By 1945 the colored population in Britain was estimated between 10,000 and
30,000. 16 Unemployment was high in colonies such as Jamaica, averaging between 20 to
35 percent, thus colonials headed to Britain in search of a decent paying job. 17 But as
Kathleen Paul noted, the decision of West Indians to migrate to the United Kingdom was
based on more than just economics. Having occupied the region for centuries, the British
encouraged colonials to think of Great Britain as the center of ‘their’ empire, thus their
identity was very much tied to a sense of Britishness. With a good grasp of the English
language and the nation’s history, colonials considered themselves British, therefore,
migrating to the ‘mother country’ was “somewhat of a homeward journey.” 18 But those
awaiting their arrival did not share this sentiment. As Paul explains, competing notions
of Britishness existed. The formal nationality policy, to which colonial subjects
subscribed, regarded all residents of the Empire as equal and was constructed to maintain
and justify imperial control. The informal policy, also devised as a means of imperial
justification in that it deemed European races and cultures superior to others, was based
on a racialized understanding of the world. “This informal identity restricted Britishness
to white residents of the United Kingdom.” 19
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As West Indian immigrants continued to arrive in Great Britain, concern and
hostility amongst the political and social elite increased. Those arriving post war were no
longer seen as valuable additions to the wartime work force or armed services, nor were
they brought in by the Colonial Office; rather they remained beyond its public control.
Black migrants were deemed likely to provoke ‘problems,’ to incite racial conflict. They
were labeled as “quarrelsome, lazy, unskilled and unenterprising.” 20 While it is difficult
to ascertain overall public opinion, it is likely that Britons of all social classes were
influenced by the nation’s colonial and imperial past and those ideas that legitimized
Britain’s superior role throughout the world. But the political elite remained resolute in
portraying Britain as a tolerant nation, one that was more tolerant than white Americans
and certainly less racist than the Nazi regime they had served to defeat. The government
was determined to present a national image that reflected an open-minded, liberal Britain
that welcomed colonial peoples as equal citizens of the empire/ commonwealth and
would be granted independence once they were ready. “But that independence was
always seen as involving a commonwealth of nations- that is retaining a political tie to
Britain.” 21
The continued flow of colored immigrants to the United Kingdom after the
Second World War ushered in a new era in British immigration policy and with it came
new challenges to Britain’s political elite. It was clear to both the Conservative and
Labour parties that Britain could not afford to have her reputation as a beneficent colonial
power diminished by the issue of race and existence of color bars, thus debates regarding
the status and restriction of colored immigrants were kept behind closed doors. But as
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Britain’s desire for great power status diminished, so did the need to placate those abroad.
A nation for so long defined by its imperial role turned its focus inward- imperial identity
waned and the notion of Britishness defined solely by those living within the United
Kingdom flourished. There was no place within this new model for the colored
immigrant, as being British in Britain still meant being white. Opposed to any notion of a
multi-cultural society, the government began discussions of restrictive legislation.
Coupled with a perceived increase in racial violence, these debates heightened public
awareness, thus the immigration issue began its move towards the public arena.
The young school teacher in Smethwick capitalized on the new found importance
of race and immigration and Griffith’s overwhelming win made it clear that the
restriction of colored immigrants into the United Kingdom was a critical issue amongst
the British electorate. The bipartisan effort to keep immigration out of public politics
was being challenged. Making it clear that each party would have to take a position, the
1964 election marked a brief hiatus from any bipartisan efforts to conceal the race and
immigration issue. No longer concerned with imperial status or a workforce to rebuild
Britain, the Conservative and Labour parties were able to support restrictive legislation.
But while both parties quickly realized that while taking a firm stance against colored
immigration could certainly produce votes, they also discovered it could alienate a
significant part of the electorate, thus the bipartisan effort to conceal the issue resurfaced.

8

CHAPTER ONE
IN THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

The Labour government’s position towards Commonwealth immigration
immediately following the Second World War was in part determined by the acute labor
shortage Britain faced in the agricultural, coal mining and textile industries. In order to
spearhead the reconstruction of the nation, it was vital the Atlee government find the
means by which to rebuild Britain’s workforce. In search of a short term solution, the
administration formed a Foreign Labour Committee to take into consideration the
increased importation of foreign labour.
By the end of 1946 the Cabinet Manpower Working Party reported an estimated
labour shortage of 1,346,000.
1

The Atlee government contemplated several means by which to reduce the

deficit including appeals to older workers and women to remain or return to the
workforce; initially it was determined that the importation of foreign labour would pose a
‘problem.’ 2 The issue of race and the biological implications of immigration were part of
Parliamentary debates surrounding migration from the start. The Cabinet Foreign Labour
Committee determined, “The question of utilising foreign labour obviously raises many
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delicate social and political issues and these would have to be considered carefully.” 3
Ministers were wary of the long-term consequences of recruiting alien labor, advising
that “any material increase in the foreign population of this country” be considered very
carefully due to “the demographic issues involved.” 4
By 1947 there was bipartisan support for increased migration based on the
argument that immigration was necessary to resolve the labour shortage. 5 But
Parliamentary debates on migration were not solely concerned with economics. It was
argued that “immigration on a large scale into a fully established society like ours could
only be welcomed without reserve if the immigrants were of good human stock and were
not prevented by their religion or race from intermarrying with the host population and
becoming merged in it.” 6 Home Secretary Chuter Ede remarked that “the intake could be
limited to entrants from the Western countries, whose traditions and social backgrounds
were more nearly equal to our own.” 7 With a strong preference for European workers, the
government favored the importation of Polish and Yugoslavian laborers under the pretext
that white Europeans could be easily assimilated. It was argued that they were made of
“the spirit and stuff of which we can make Britons,” 8 and they could be “assimilated into
the British people, to become acquainted with, and to follow, the British way of life.” 9
During the debate on displaced persons, one Conservative MP claimed that “there are the
3
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strongest possible ethnographical reasons for having an infusion of vigorous new blood
from overseas at the present time,” noting that “we have very greatly benefited… from
other foreign blood at different times in the course of our history.” 10 References were
made to “stock” and “race” claiming the biological advantages and suggesting that the
British government “act quickly [and] get the best of the pick.” 11 By instituting
racialized criteria to determine which workers were considered the best ‘stock’, the
‘source of supply’ was limited to Europe (with the exception of Ireland).
In search of cheap labor, the Atlee government turned towards Polish soldiers
who had fought under British command during the war and were still in military camps
throughout Europe. Such troops remained the financial responsibility of the British, thus
the government moved to solve two problems at once by offering Poles work in
construction, agriculture and mining. In May 1946 the government established the Polish
Resettlement Corps to facilitate their entry into British society; officers from the Ministry
of Labour served to guide Poles into civilian employment. 12 But shortages continued
forcing the Atlee government to look elsewhere for free labor. Citing the success of the
Polish workers, the administration advocated the importation of ex-prisoners of war and
forced labor and Jews from Nazi concentration camps in West Germany and Austria. In
September 1945, approximately 1.8 million displaced persons (DPs) were scattered

10
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across Europe. 13 Employing aggressive campaign tactics to lure labor, the British
government issued work permits to foreign labor at a rate of 35,000 per year. 14
Upon arrival, refugees were required to sign contracts accepting work assigned by
the Minister of Labour. They were directed to employment in agriculture, textile
production, coal mining and domestic service. Initially restricted in the work they could
accept, after three years of residence, such restrictions were lifted. 15 Due to the success of
alien recruitment and a continued labor shortage, by Spring 1947 government officials
began offering foreign laborers permanent settlement within the United Kingdom. This
offer was extended based on the idea that Poles and other Europeans could become
British. With a clear preference for importing white labor from the start, it was suggested
that white workers were considered more suitable for the industries where labor was
needed, but it was also assumed that they could easily assimilate into British society.
Regardless of differences in culture, language and politics, the British elite believed these
laborers could become British solely based on their common genetic makeup. 16
While European migrant workers may have been required to accept only specific
jobs in designated industries and offered substandard government housing, they received
better treatment than the British subjects who arrived from the colonies and
Commonwealth. These migrants represented another source of labor, albeit one that was
ignored presumably because they were not considered of ‘good human stock.’ 17 In fact,

13
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in 1948, when Geoffrey Isaacs, the Minister of Labour was informed that a ship carrying
“some hundreds of West Indians, many of them ex-service men skilled in various trades”
and in search of work was on its way to Britain, the Minister replied that the men would
be sent to local employment exchanges, but that he could “give no assurance that they
could be found suitable work” and that he hoped “no encouragement would be given to
others to follow their example.” 18 When asked if the government would make
arrangements for these “British citizens in a strange land,” he rejected the notion stating
that, “If they suffer any inconvenience, the blame will be on those that sent them not on
those who receive them.” 19 The British government essentially extended the benefits of
membership to aliens deemed acceptable for assimilation based on their racial makeup
while denying such rights to their own citizens. Political decisions were clearly based on
ideological assumptions, as the Labour Government chose to recruit alien labor from the
Continent while failing to extend the same policies to British subjects of color.
The government moved to distance itself from any racial prejudice and the issue
of ‘colored immigration’ claiming there was “no colour prejudice at all with regard to
[West Indian] employment.” But debate ensued behind closed doors. A correspondence
between Sir Harold Wiles and M.M. Bevan on 8 March 1948 indicates that consideration
was given to the idea of using ‘surplus colonial manpower’ to meet the labour shortage.
Wiles suggested that:
Unlike ex-prisoners of war or other aliens, I assume there could be no
authority for deporting coloured British subjects if they felt they wished to
stay here and take their chance. If there were any assurance these people
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could in fact be sent away when they had served their purpose, this
proposition might be less unacceptable. 20
Furthermore, he argued that he “did not think any scheme for the importation of coloured
colonials for permanent settlement should be embarked upon without full understanding
that this means that a coloured element will be brought in for permanent absorption into
our own population.” 21
However determined the Labour government was to curb the flow of colored
migration from the colonies, as Arthur Creech-Jones, MP pointed out when asked if the
government intended on establishing a system by which West Indian migrants could be
vetted out and it ascertained beforehand whether they were suitable for employment in
Britain, British leaders could not “interfere with the movement of British subjects.” 22
While centuries of colonialism and an informal national policy deemed colonial subjects
inferior and unworthy of certain British rights, British law stated otherwise- law that was
introduced by the same Labour government.
The Atlee administration’s proposal for legislation defining the status of British
subjects was not based on a new found philosophy of equality, but rather in an effort to
shore up Empire at the close of the Second World War. By 1945 Britain's position as a
world power had been diminished. Most of its manufacturing infrastructure was
destroyed, its export economy severely crippled, and its war debts totaled over £4.7
billion. Economically exhausted, its overseas assets had been liquidated, leaving its
ability to influence international affairs severely hampered. Determined to preserve its
role alongside the U.S. and Soviet powers, the empire took on new significance in the
20
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postwar era. 23 Representing the imperial population of Great Britain and the
Commonwealth verses just those that inhabited the United Kingdom secured Britain a
seat at the international table. Thus, when the Canadian government proposed legislation
defining independent Canadian citizenship, the Labour government was forced to counter
with legislation of its own.
Prior to 1945, the United Kingdom had permitted territories to create local
citizenships intended to carry weight only in the area of origin. In keeping with the
notion of a single nationality throughout the Empire, Her Majesty’s Government held that
residents of the Empire were first and foremost British subjects. Proposed Canadian
legislation attempted to challenge the status quo, placing exclusive Canadian citizenship
above the status of British subject. Fearing that any attempt to forestall the scheme
would divide the Commonwealth and in due course imperial unity as a whole, British
policy makers determined it wise to placate Canadian officials. Thus, deliberations began
to devise a British nationality law intending to appease Dominion governments while
ultimately solidifying loyalty to the British crown.
While policy makers were able to agree in terms of granting the dominions equal
status, determining the position of colonials was met with difficulty. An
Interdepartmental Working Party was assembled to establish the best strategy for colonial
status. Countering the position of the Home and Foreign Offices that each colony should
be granted a separate citizenship, the Colonial Office argued that in order to ensure
colonials continued to regard themselves as British they must share a single, common
nationality with the United Kingdom. Bestowing a separate citizenship assigned them
secondary status.
23
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Intent on securing imperial unity and preserving Britain's position at the center of
the empire, the Atlee government put forth the 1948 British Nationality Act, creating a
common citizenship for residents of the United Kingdom and its colonies. Dominions
were able to legislate their own citizenship laws, but these would remain secondary to
those of the Great Britain. Allowing Dominion governments the right to establish local
citizenships appeased national governments while at the same time reaffirming their
citizens' common status as British subject. This overarching status as citizen of the
United Kingdom and Colonies (UKC) remained predominant on the international stage
and thus secured Britain's position as a world power.
Although Conservative MPs were rather ambiguous towards the Bill, it did not
pass without resistance. The main point of contention between the two parties lay in
extending the status of British subject to citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies.
The opposition argued that citizens of the colonies and Commonwealth were already
British subjects, as imperial nationality was a right granted to all those born within the
Empire. Such legislation served to weaken imperial links. Conservatives objected to the
proposed UKC citizenship on the pretext that creating a single citizenship for such a
diverse collection of peoples was unsuitable. David Maxwell-Fyfe, the Conservative
spokesman on home affairs, suggested that citizenship should be assigned based on a
shared sense of community and status rather than parliamentary sovereignty. 24
Labour was willing to look past the informal policy in order to maintain the
Empire and Britain’s international standing, while the Tories continued to cling to the

24
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“familial ‘British’ community of the old dominions.” 25 Labour’s goal was solely to ward
off colonial independence and believed the Bill was a means by which they could give
colonials “a feeling that… we recognize them as fellow citizens.” But Labour’s objective
of raising colonials “to such a position of education, of training, and of experience that
they too shall be able to share the grant of full self-government which this House has so
generously given in the last few years to other places” offered the same notion of
superiority and inequality as the Conservative position that colonials should not share a
common citizenship with those in the United Kingdom. 26 While Labour’s paternalistic
view may seem more palatable, the fact remains that both parties, regardless of
intentions, held a racialized view of the Empire and the world. The Labour government
suggested colonials needed the British to educate and advance them, while Conservatives
argued against the consideration of equal status. Regardless of any formal policy,
members of both parties had a clear definition of Britishness and it did not include
colored residents of Britain’s overseas possessions.
Nonetheless, both parties remained cognizant that Britain must present itself as a
tolerant, progressive society. In the parliamentary debates Conservative Maxwell Fyfe
stated, ‘We are proud that we impose no colour bar restrictions making it difficult for
them when they come here … we must maintain our great metropolitan tradition of
hospitality to everyone from every part of our Empire.” 27 According to the Conservative
policy of the next year, “there must be freedom of movement amongst its members

25

Paul, “British Subjects, British Stock,” 248.
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 453 (1948), cols. 394-98; (Lords) 5th ser., vol. 155
(1984), col. 757 in Paul, “British Subjects, British Stock,” 249.
27
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), vol. 453, col. 405, 7 July 1948 in Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of
Immigration: Immigration, race, and Race Relations in Post-War Britain (Cambridge: Blackwell
Publishers, 1992): 10.
26

17

within the British Empire and Commonwealth. New opportunities will present
themselves not only in the countries overseas but in the Mother Country, and must be
open to all citizens.” 28 Committed to the right of free movement, Conservatives were
concerned about the rights of those residing in the independent Commonwealth countries
of Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, but were aware that such rights
would apply equally to the inhabitants in the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. However, it
was assumed the majority of migration would be movement from Britain to the Empire
and that the source of any inward flow would be the Old Dominions.
By 1953 an estimated 40,000 non-white of immigrants had arrived in Great
Britain. The influx of West Indian and South Asian migration was characterized by chain
migration- individuals migrated, friends and relatives followed, who in turn sent for
additional friends and relatives. The first wave of immigrants took accommodations in
the industrial towns in which they found jobs; they were later joined by relatives,
allowing settlements of individuals from the same family or village to become
concentrated in a single neighborhood. The settlement pattern of colored migrants
created ethnic pockets throughout Britain. For instance, the majority of Pakistanis,
especially those from the Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir, settled in the north, while
Bangladeshis resided in East London and Gujarati Indians spread across the Midlands. 29
As the concentration in England’s major cities became evident, hostility towards new
settlers from their white working-class neighbor’s became evident. The British working
class had accepted the notion of common citizenship under the assumption it would
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remain theoretical, but when it seemed that colored migrants were to be treated as their
equals, or rather that their own position of superiority in relation to blacks was no longer
recognized, the white working-class became seriously concerned. 30
Black immigrants had been regarded with suspicion as early as 1919 when many
colored men chose to remain in Britain after being discharged from His Majesty’s Forces
and the Merchant Navy at the close of the First World War. The numbers were rather
infinitesimal, but regardless of size, the colored population was nonetheless regarded as
alien. The black population was viewed as a potential threat to security, especially in
terms of employment, thus it is no surprise that disturbances erupted between whites and
colored migrants. “Public opinion strongly favoured the repatriation of Negroes to the
Colonies and many in fact were persuaded to return” and “attempts were make to prevent
further Negro immigration and to encourage the replacement of coloured firemen by
white on British ships.” 31 Thus the combined sense of superiority engrained in Britons
through centuries of imperialism coupled with perceived competition in employment and
services posed by the arrival of black migrants produced tensions throughout England
defined solely by race. Notions of colored immigrants as lazy, unskilled individuals of
low social status and bad hygiene began to spread. As more West Indian and South
Asian migrants arrived in England’s industrial towns, tensions grew. Sporadic outbreaks
of violence against blacks erupted in Deptford, Notting Hill and Nottingham, lending
credence to any notion that colored immigration posed a ‘problem’ in Britain. British
politicians found themselves facing new problems as the 1950s progressed. While the
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postwar Labour Government had moved to strengthen imperial ties and rebuild Britain’s
workforce, the Conservative government of the next decade faced a new set of
challenges. The years immediately following the war have been described as somewhat
“halcyon times, since politicians were able to take a relaxed attitude free of the pressures
that haunted their successors in the next decade.” 32 Home Secretary Roy Jenkins
asserted that:
In the early fifties it was easy to be enlightened about immigration – easy
both for the progressive middle class who have always judged
immigration policy with the objective view that comes from rarely seeing
a black face and never living next to a black neighbour, and for the
industrial workers of Bradford and Birmingham.” 33
Jenkins argued that immigration was not a large issue until the latter half of the 1950s, as
it was at this point that the Eden government began to discuss the implementation of
restrictive legislation.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE 1950s CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT

There is a danger that may be faced with the need for
urgent action when it is too late. The ideal time for
legislation cannot be defined by reference to any precise
criteria and the prudent course would be to legislate
without delay. 1

The arrival of colored immigrants to the United Kingdom posed a problem to
fundamental liberal and conservative ideologies. The rise and fall of Nazi Germany and
its doctrine of racial supremacy challenged previous beliefs in that imperial justification
on the basis of racial superiority was no longer acceptable. Thus, by the inter-war period
a new set of doctrines had been introduced in the form of the white man’s burden and the
dual mandate, employing the notion of universal human rights, a belief shared by both
political ideologies. But Conservative politicians held that while all men should be
afforded the same rights under the law, this did not necessarily translate into equal
opportunity or equality of life chances. The fundamentals of conservative political
discussions were shaped by the idea that all men shared basic legal rights, but kept with
the view that colonial natives should keep to their place. Liberal ideology held that state
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intervention was necessary to ensure freedom and equal opportunity, but the notion of
universal human rights throughout the Empire forced liberalism to change its nature.
Some Liberals answered with ardent anti-imperialism, while others chose to
compartmentalize their ideology, suggesting it pertained only to the domestic metropolis.
Thus, the migration of colonial natives to Britain presented a serious challenge to both
conservative and liberal beliefs. 2
Members within the Labour and Conservative parties held different positions in
terms of immigration. Some Conservatives favored immigration on economic grounds,
understanding the dire need for labor within Britain. Former colonials often defended
immigration in an effort to speak of for those they formerly governed. But there was also
a faction of the Conservative party that opposed immigration all along. These members
generally remained ‘backbenchers’ until given a voice by the 1958 riots and 1964
election in Smethwick. Labour radicals favored immigration on the same grounds as
those Conservatives who had the economic development of Britain in mind; idealists
favored immigration in order to keep the Commonwealth in tact. In the minority before
1963, Labour’s Conservative Right opposed non-white immigration purely on racial
grounds, believing that regardless of the economic benefits colored migration presented,
non-whites could not be assimilated or absorbed into British culture.
Overall, the Labour party showed concern with immigration from the start. In
May 1950, the Secretary of State for the Colonies issued a memorandum requested by the
Cabinet addressing the immigration of coloured people to the United Kingdom. The
report suggested that coloured immigration was posing problems in the areas of housing,
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employment, and law and order and proposed discouraging coloured colonials from
migrating as a potential solution; however, in ascertaining that the number of coloured
migrants was still relatively small, the Labour government determined it unnecessary to
take immediate action. 3 The point is that the administration was considering it and it
should be noted that there was serious concern amongst Labour politicians over the
immigration of a few thousand black people. The Cabinet revisited the issue one month
later to review the possible measures for control and potential ramifications of restrictive
legislation, 4 but it was determined again that the coloured population in Britain was so
small that taking any controversial action should be avoided, and though not justifiable at
the time, any future increase may warrant control. 5
The fact that the Labour government entered discussions about curbing colonial
immigration while still in the midst of a labor shortage substantiates the claim that racial
prejudice was a clear factor in the Labour government’s discouraging mindset. While the
attitude of trade unions and fear that the reconstruction effort would be short-lived played
a part, had all imported labor been of pure European descent, restrictive measures would
hardly have been discussed, as they were welcomed as a positive asset, while black
workers were seen as provoking racial prejudice and causing public disturbances. Thus
illegitimate reasons were invented by some civil servants in an attempt to justify control.6
Sharing Labour’s concerns and recognizing that a potential problem may be
brewing, after taking power in 1951 the Conservative government began discussing
3
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restrictive legislation, albeit behind closed doors. Such legislation was not presented in
the 1950s for several reasons centering on the desire to keep Britain in good standing
with the Commonwealth and maintain her position as a world power; furthermore the
Tories wanted to prove that they could resolve the economic problems resulting from the
war and regain and solidify their position as the natural rulers of Britain.
Issues abroad were beginning to pose problems, mainly the nationalist regime in
Britain’s dominion of South Africa and its open segregationist policies. World opinion
held that the United Nations should intercede, a notion that the Conservative government
did not support on the basis that stepping in may drive the nationalists further into
isolation. Nonetheless, worried about the international repercussions, British officials
knew they needed to present themselves as hostile to the racist policies developing in the
area and were aware that any sense of a race relations issue brewing in Britain would call
their position into question. As Lord Salisbury stated, ‘We have a reputation to maintain
as champion of liberal western civilisation. We must maintain this reputation not only in
the UN but also before our public opinion and what is more important with our
colonies.” 7
The Churchill administration wanted to present an enlightened view of
conservatism to the world, thus whenever suggestions of restriction were voiced in the
Cabinet protests were raised in fear of a blanket policy which may prohibit the entry of
Commonwealth citizens. Lord Hume stated, “we do not wish to keep out immigration is a
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policy to which we have always subscribed,” 8 his predecessor Lord Swinton suggesting
that “If we legislate on immigration, though we draft in non-discriminatory terms, we
cannot conceal the obvious fact that the object is to keep out coloured peoples. Unless
there is really a strong case for this, it would surely be an unwise moment to raise the
issue when we are preaching and trying to practise partnership in the abolution of the
Colour Bar.” 9 Events in the southern United States highlighted racial tensions in the
international arena, presenting an opportunity for British leadership to present the multiracial Commonwealth as a symbol of tolerance and newly enlightened force. 10
Concerned about the opposition’s reaction to proposed restrictions, Conservative
leaders hesitated to put forth any legislation that may prove controversial; any changes to
immigration policy needed to be free of partisan politics. In order to prevent giving the
Labour government an opportunity to take the moral high ground and avoid the
embarrassment of having the opposition and half the Commonwealth against them, the
Churchill administration deemed it necessary to gauge Labour opinion and possible
reaction. The Conservative government held deliberation over possible restrictive
legislation in 1954 at which time Lord Swinton urged Cabinet Members to establish
contact with members of the Labour party. 11
There was cause to believe that the Labour party would adamantly oppose
restrictions, as pressure against discrimination was always presented by Labour
politicians, many of which pressed for legislation that would ensure equal treatment in
8
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employment and housing. As Labour representative Kenneth Robinson stated, he
“doubted if the government would introduce legislation to limit immigration because they
know the opposition they would meet.” 12 While it may have been a risk to adopt a
position that may prove unpopular amongst the white, working class, Labour leaders did
not think race would become an issue. At the time, most discussions were held within
confined political circles; they believed they had little to lose politically and perhaps
more to gain by taking the moral high ground and opposing restriction.
Race may not have become an issue had the rate of immigration remained as it
was at the beginning of the 1950s; however, the rate did increase- within twenty years
there were 1.6 million colored people living in Britain. 13 The changing demographic
served to benefit the position of backbenchers such as Cyril Osborn, Normal Pannell,
Harold Gurden, and Martin Lindsay who, opposing immigration, cited inflated figures
and warned against the possible ramifications of mass immigration such as overcrowded
hospitals, the resurfacing of diseases such as tuberculosis, and increased criminal
activity. 14 While racist ideas in Parliament remained the minority, the constituency for
which they spoke began to increase steadily as the 1950s progressed. In 1954 The Times
published an article titled “First Signs of a British Colour Problem” and several years
later the BBC presented a special program on the subject. Public concern began to grow,
centered on issues such as housing, particularly in the industrial areas and the suggestion
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that slum conditions were worsening due to overcrowding an unsanitary conditions of
West Indian and Asian immigrants.
Reports issued by a 1958 working party noted that colored immigrants lived in
“dirty and overcrowded conditions” which was “as much from choice as necessity,” 15
and that they were employed in unskilled jobs of the lowest grade industries. According
to the reports, Southeast Asians were difficult to place in employment due to their
inability to speak English 16 and unemployment was certain to increase due to the scarcity
of semi and unskilled jobs, which were “the only ones for which coloured people [were]
suitable.” 17 In addition, the working party noted that they were not Christian. 18 But these
same reports noted that the immigrants were “law-abiding, tend[ed] to keep to
themselves, and form[ed] a useful addition to the country’s labour force.” 19 Reports went
on to describe the South Asian immigrants as showing “no desire to mix with white
people or other immigrants” and noted that the “arrival of increasing numbers fosters the
tendency to associate only with each other.” 20 Police reports warned that the degree of
assimilation failed to increase, but the British administration never attempted to promote
the integration of such migrants. Cabinet ministers focused solely on the prevention of
further migration, never contemplating how the problems they believed to be associated
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with migration could be ameliorated by any other means than nationality law. 21
Furthermore, cabinet papers note that this “lack of intermingling was due to the attitude
of both races.” 22
The majority of immigrants in the early 1950s were West Indian; they were
viewed as noisy and having loose sexual morals. The high number of single men and
convenience of a common language resulted in more interaction between the races and
prostitution than would have been the case had families migrated together. 23 The influx
of South Asian migration in the late 1950s to early 1960s was characterized by chain
migration- individuals migrated, friends and relatives followed, who in turn sent for
additional friends and relatives. The first wave of immigrants took accommodations in
the industrial towns in which they found jobs; they were later joined by relatives,
allowing settlements of individuals from the same family or village to become
concentrated in a single neighborhood, creating ethnic pockets throughout Britain. The
segregation of communities came to be seen as the self-segregation created by
immigrants; the belief spread that the ethnic community was attempting to create its own
exclusive neighborhoods in an attempt to exclude whites and prevent the mixing of
cultures.
In the summer of 1958 riots broke out between colored immigrants and whites in
Nottingham and Notting Hill. Labeled a ‘race riots’ by the press, it is unclear whether the
actions were inspired by racial strife but, nonetheless, backbenchers pushing for
restrictions attempted to use the events in their favor, arguing that “What we ignore at our
21
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peril is the bitter resentment often felt by the local white English citizens.” 24 Those
favoring control began to lobby for restrictions as soon as Parliament returned to session;
the cause was the same, but the arguments different. “Sooner or later some control would
have to be put on. If it is not put on soon we shall, whether we like it or not- this is what
I fear and am very frightened about it- have Little Rocks and Notting Hill incidents over
and over again.” 25 However, the administration decided it was not the opportune time to
present such legislation, partly due to the recent Suez Crisis and its effects through out
the Commonwealth.
The immediate government reaction was to ensure that law and order was
maintained in the areas.
It would be desirable to make it clear that, in the view of the Government,
law and order must be maintained irrespective of the racial characteristics
of individuals. It would be important to avoid, if possible, any major
pronouncement on Commonwealth immigration. We should continue to
deal with the problem empirically and shall base our action on the
practical considerations of the availability of housing and the capacity of
the labor market. 26
On the surface the government continued to support the notion of a common
status for all Commonwealth citizens, however, behind closed doors were attempting to
restrict entry by other means such as “administrative legislations and government
circulars and letters.” 27 The government adopted a series of administrative controls in an
attempt to curb the flow stemming from the Indian sub-continent. Such controls were
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enforced by the governments of India and Pakistan. Passport application fees were
increased and deposits required to cover possible repatriation fees. 28 Passports were
denied on the basis that prospects did not intend on permanently establishing themselves
in the United Kingdom 29 , and notices were placed in Indian newspapers detailing the
harsh living conditions and unemployment migrants were likely to find in Britain.
Public awareness of the immigration situation had been building through the
1950; by the end of the decade public opinion became more important to the political
parties, thus, Conservative and Labour leaders were forced to formulate party policy.
The Tories remained divided, with some believing there was considerable support behind
the idea of restrictive immigration while others feared taking any controversial position
so close to an election. The Labour party reacted by moving towards the opposition of
controls and proposition of discrimination laws, however, there were clear anti-immigrant
and racist feelings within the trade union movement which the Parliamentary Labour
Party chose to ignore for purposes of political expediency. 30 Although discussions on
immigration control became more public, the leadership of both parties avoided
commenting on the race issue outright. However, Tory candidates used racial innuendo
to attack some Labour candidates with liberal records in terms of immigration, and
Conservative backbenchers placed increased pressure on the leadership of their own party
to control immigration.
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To the credit of party leadership, immigration and race relations were not part of
the 1959 election. 31 With the Tories returning to power, it was likely no serious
consideration was going to be given to restrictive legislation or any anti-discrimination
laws, however, the resounding Conservative victory brought a faction of new Members to
the House of Commons who, hailing from constituencies with a large number of
immigrants, favored demands for control.32 These members could claim direct
constituency experience of the difficulties associated with immigration- a claim which,
for reasons of electoral geography, was previously mainly confined to Labour Members.
But perhaps most significant, these Members were claiming the view they were putting
forward as representative of public opinion at large. In this claim they were assisted by
the setting up in the Birmingham area of a lobbying organization, the Birmingham
Immigration Control Association. 33
Given a voice by the ‘riots’ of 1958 and fostered by the election of Ministers
favoring their cause, political ‘backbenchers’ not only became more vocal, but also
started to organize their efforts. At the beginning of 1961, Conservative MP for Selly
Oak, Harold Gurden, organized a private meeting of backbenchers from London,
Birmingham, Liverpool, and Manchester, all areas with large concentrations of coloured
migrants, to organize their efforts to support restrictive legislation. 34 A motion was
presented by Cyril Osborne that required Commonwealth immigrants to present evidence
that they had guaranteed employment and housing, were in good health and no criminal
31
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record in order to reside in Britain, suggesting that such measures were necessary to do
the housing crisis, unemployment rates, growth of slums, and strain on welfare services.
Nationally, unemployment wasn’t necessarily a grave issue however rates remained high
in areas where there were large concentrations of immigrants. But what backbenchers
failed to mention was that as much as one-third of unemployed immigrants were women
and two-thirds had been out of work for less than eight weeks. 35
But the racial motives behind such positions were illuminated by remarks made
by Osborne and other proponents of control. Osborne stated that the reasons colored
immigrants were such a ‘problem’ was because “they have altogether a different standard
of civilization,” 36 and that “This is a white man’s country and I was it to remain so.” 37
Osborne and Pannell went on to contend that the construction of a Sikh temple in
Smethwick served as a threat to Christianity and that the influx of immigrants was
causing a serious outbreak of venereal disease. 38 While some Members showed genuine
concern based on housing and employment issues, the debates still took on an openly
racial tone. But party leadership continued to minimize every problem mentioned in an
attempt to avoid any notions of discrimination. Ironically, David Renton, government
spokesman and Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office stated that the
problems would become worse if immigration continued, declaring that although
Government was not ready to take action, they were considering possible solutions. 39
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Fred van Hardsvedlt argued that “no rational political can afford to ignore an
issue of concern to more than 80 percent of the electorate,” but the question remains
whether the vast majority of Britons opposed colored immigration to the extent that the
backbenchers claimed. 40 Home Secretary R.A. Butler openly admitted that the
Government had begun to move towards control, but it is necessary to investigate
whether public opinion drove government or the actions of the political elite shaped
public opinion. While some believe that public opinion created pressures on
Government, many argue that it as the government that politicized the problems
associated with coloured immigration in order to show the public the necessity of
introduction immigration control; 41 although public opinion is often perceived by a few
observers as creating pressures on the Government to pass restrictive legislation, many
claim that actions and inactions of elite political were responsible for the state of public
opinion and for governmental action in the fields of race relations and immigration
policy. 42 Furthermore, in light of the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill
of 1962, we must ask what caused Government to abandon the policy they firmly
believed would solidify their position as a world power.
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CHAPTER THREE
TOWARDS RESTRICTION AND INTO THE PUBLIC GAZE

Through the 1940s and early 1950s there was little official or public concern
about the flow of migration from the New Commonwealth. Such migration was accepted
by the Labour and Conservative Governments on the basis that it was part of the joint
economic effort to rebuild Britain after the Second World War and the belief that liberal
legislation was necessary in order to maintain Commonwealth unity. The arrival of
colored immigrants caused little reaction from the British public; it was generally
assumed that such migrants would assimilate culturally and economically into greater
British society. The issue remained in a ‘pre-political age’ due to an unspoken consensus
that any problems that existed would right themselves in the end. 1 Some Conservative
backbenchers voiced discontent and several attempts made at the Cabinet level to limit
the number arrivals, none of which really came to fruition due to the Nationality Act of
1948. Restricting immigration would involve amending the Act, which was both a
complicated parliamentary procedure and an act the government wanted to avoid for
reasons highlighted previously. 2
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Following the 1958 riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill, incidents that
influenced Conservative backbenchers, brought more illiberal parliamentary candidates
to office, and sparked a sense of xenophobia within Conservative local organizations, the
race and immigration issue was becoming more and more divisive. 3 Initially the two
parties held opposite views on the issue; the Conservative leadership was beginning to
react to the pressure from those favoring restrictions, while Labour remained vehemently
opposed. However, within a few years, the debate moved from polarization to consensus.
In an effort to prohibit the issue from electoral contests, both parties adopted moderate
and somewhat interchangeable positions on immigration. 4
Through out the 1950s the Labour Party was dominated by those who supported
human equality, but as the decade came to a close, party leaders began to recognize the
political dangers of taking such a position. As the controversy grew more intense, it
began to take on unmistakable political overtones. In July 1960 the official policy of free
entry still remained, but increasing pressure was placed on the governments of Pakistan,
India and the West Indies to control emigration from their ports. In the meantime, local
Conservatives began to challenge Labour candidates with more openly racist campaigns;
the Tories implied that Labour favored immigration, later associating any issues
associated with blacks as problems fostered by Labour’s position. 5
In 1962 a faction of the Labour party supporting a centrist view emerged.
Members such as Richard Crossman, Roy Hattersley, Frank Soskice, and Labour leader
Harold Wilson supported entry restrictions on the grounds that they would allay the sense
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of xenophobia emerging in Britain; a position that, unlike that of the Conservatives, was
not racially prejudice. However, it is important to note that the main concern of Labour
was to become the majority party in Britain which they believed they could accomplish
by taking the middle ground. They believed race issue as politically volatile, a “political
joker that not only could impede Labour from immediately gaining power but, also, and
perhaps more importantly, deflect the party from its post-1951 adherence to centrist, nonideological politics.” 6 Labour’s new race policy was merely part of a strategy, which
while repugnant to the party’s Left, was viewed as fundamental to Centrists in an effort to
gain national office. Centrist MPs firmly believed that the only way to gain a
parliamentary majority was to capture the middle-ground and to do so must “project a
more contemporary, classless image than in the past;” to be “regarded as efficient,
energetic and up-to-date – concerned with the problems of the 60s and the new Britain.” 7
Thus, party leaders made the decision to avoid all policy commitments that might
polarize public opinion along party lines and adopted the same position as the opposition.
As Richard Crossman stated, “We felt we had to out-trump the Tories by doing what they
would have done and so transforming their policy into a bipartisan policy.” 8 By aligning
with the political opposition, Labour leaders hoped to avoid taking a position that may
require public defense. 9
Research shows that the Conservative Government of the 1950s sought evidence
proving that colored immigration posed a problem in Britain in order to justify the
consideration and later implementation of legislation restricting the British settlement of
6
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colored migrants from the New Commonwealth. In 1955 the Cabinet ascertained that
public opinion had not ‘matured sufficiently’ enough to guarantee support for restrictive
measures. 10 Opinion poll data shows that in 1951, only a third of those polled were
opposed to the entry of British subjects from the colonies; in 1956, as much as 71 percent
agreed that ‘coloured’ British subjects had a right to enter Britain when compared to
European migrants such as Italians and Poles. 11 Yet just a few years later, polls suggest
widespread support for immigration control. 12
Public opinion seemed to change drastically in just a few years time. Originally
tolerant of migration from the Commonwealth, the British public began to take a rather
hostile stance. Robert Miles suggests that contrary to arguments that racist ideals
stemming from a colonial past permeated all of British society, British public opinion
regarding colonial immigration remained rather fluid. He argues against the notion that
racism was a monolithic ideological bloc, noting that while propaganda such as
contemporary newspaper headlines and racially charged cartoons were present, what
needs to be examined is whether or not the British public actually received the message
and whether it remained relevant. 13 Furthermore, it is important consider the impact of
government action on the nature of British public opinion. In moving towards restriction,
were the political elite responding to mass opinion, or had the government cultivated an
atmosphere of intolerance in order to justify restrictive measures?
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Through out the 1950s and into the 1960s, the importance of Commonwealth had
begun to fade. The Cold War of the 1960s brought in what Harold Macmillan called ‘the
winds of change;’ the United States and Soviet Union began to vie for the support of
independence movements in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, severely marginalizing and
sense of British influence. 14 At the heart of the matter was the economy. Exhausted from
the cost of the war, Britain was no longer able to afford her empire, as new military
technology had made imperial defense much more expensive, albeit the costs of empire
had begun to outweigh the benefits long before. British defense expenditures amounted
to 5.8 percent of gross national product between 1947 and 1987; no longer able to
manage her trade deficit with the income from overseas investments, Britain faced a
crushing foreign debt burden, not to mention that the much larger costs of nationalized
health care, transport and industry had to be met. 15 After the Second World War, Britain
turned to the United States for a loan, the ramifications of which proved grave, ultimately
diminishing Britain’s international power. In return for the loan, US policy makers
insisted the conversion of the pound into the dollar within a year, resulting in a run on the
Bank of England and starting the first is a series of sterling crises. “In the early 1950s,
Harold Macmillan declared that the choice facing the country was between ‘the slide into
a shoddy and slushy Socialism (and second rate power), or the march to the third British
Empire.’ After Suez only the first option seemed to remain.” 16
The total of trade with the Commonwealth remained substantially large, but after
the British entry into the ‘Common Market,’ European protectionist tariffs forced British
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trade to focus on the continent rather than the Commonwealth. But the issue with the
Commonwealth was not necessarily its waning economic importance to the United
Kingdom, but rather its growing political impotence. 17 With Britain’s gradual decline,
international dominance was no longer of drastic importance. Political leaders turned
their focus away from the preservation of Empire and Commonwealth and towards the
maintenance of Great Britain itself. With Commonwealth unity no longer at the forefront
of political minds, the government was able to consider restrictive legislation, regardless
of its implications. Thus, the Conservative government passed the Commonwealth
Immigrants Act in 1962 because, “the formal policy was no longer capable of
maintaining Empire in its most desirable form…its commitment to free entry threatened
the political elite’s perception of the true identity of the ‘British’ people.” 18
The actions of government and state officials were partly motivated by racism,
and in terms of racism within the overall British population, many argue that this was
simply a means by which to legitimize the actions taken by the political elite. Citing the
overall unity of British society as their goal, decision-makers believed it necessary to
prevent “a significant change in the racial character of the English people.” 19 Convinced
any significant change in the racial makeup of Britain would pose serious problems
between ‘whites’ and ‘coloured people,’ leaders believed it necessary to manipulated
public opinion in an effort to ensure that the British public reached the same conclusions.
Public opinion on the issue had barely formed in the late 1940s into the 1950s, thus
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British officials needed to convince the masses that the presence of colored immigrants
was problematic and, thus, needed to be prevented. 20
At the end of 1960 the Home Office contemplated possible administrative and
regulatory means which might be employed in order to reduce immigration form certain
parts of the Commonwealth, but their efforts proved ineffective. As Colonial Secretary
Iain MacLeod stated, “administrative measures will not really serve. The choice must be
between trying to hold these administrative measures or legislation.” 21 Thus, a Cabinet
committee was formed to examine immigration and consider the possibility for broad
legislative controls. 22 Determined to exhaust all ideas surrounding limited emigration
and not yet committed to restrictive legislation, the Government placed the issue of
immigration on the agenda for the 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference. 23
The placement of immigration control on the back burner fueled the cause of
backbenchers, prompting them to respond with new found vigor. In a letter to The Times,
Harold Gurden, MP stated that the ‘saturation point’ of immigration had been reached
throughout the Midlands. 24 Conversations surrounding controls became more
widespread, pushing the issue into the public eye and increasing the urgency for
restrictive measures.
Immigration Control Associations began to form at the end of 1960 and beginning
of 1961 to lobby Parliament and publicize the dire need for legislation. The associations
took on extremely racist tones. Letters were published speaking to the threat colored
20
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immigration posed to “the spirit and purity of white Christians,” the dangers of a multiracial society, 25 and notions of overcrowded hospitals and strange diseases continued.
The most powerful organization was the Birmingham Immigration Control Association
(BICA). The organization, formed in October 1960, called for restrictions to immigrant
settlement within Birmingham; their cause was given a great deal of publicity in the
Birmingham Mail. The group sent postcards to the House of Commons declaring that
residents of Birmingham were “’suffering the consequences’ of uncontrolled
immigration, and called on Members of Parliament to ‘vote against the come-who-may
policy’ or lose the sender’s vote;” the group went on to circulate petitions for Cyril
Osborne, collecting some 50,000 signatures. 26 With anti-immigrant organizations such
making the intensity of grass-roots anti-immigrant sentiment quite evident, some suggest
that the Conservative governments move towards restriction was in response to the
involvement of local Conservative activists with anti-immigration organizations such as
the BICA. 27 As Paul Foot suggested:
[I]mmigration Control Associations which arose in Birmingham and the
surrounding area in 1960 and 1961, by means of their concentration on a
single issue [and] their ability to move freely among members of
established political parties… had a great impact on British politics.
The Government responded to anti-immigrant charges by stating that rumors that
restrictive legislation was being contemplated were false with Iain MacLeod issuing a
categorical denial to the press. But these were false statements in themselves.
Immigration statistics and the demand for action from the rank-and-file Members of
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Parliament forced a decisive response from Conservative party leadership. 28 At the
annual conference of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations held
in October 1961, Home Secretary R.A. Butler announced that all possible solutions had
been considered and ultimately found ineffective, thus, immigration controls were
necessary and that restrictive legislation would be introduced. 29 The Commonwealth
Immigrant Bill was published twenty four hours after Parliament opened on November 1,
1961, receiving Royal Assent on April 18, 1962. 30
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and R.A. Butler cited the cost of housing and
influx of migrants as the official reasons for the Bill, noting that the tendency of
immigrants to cluster into certain areas was causing social problems in Britain. They
claimed that the government would not be able to control such problems if immigrants
continued to arrive at the current rate. The Bill introduced a voucher system, granting
migrants entry based on their skill and whether they had secured employment before
arrival. But the Bill clearly had a color bias, as the Irish were conveniently exempt- all
other groups arriving in significant numbers were colored.
The Labour opposition to the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was led by Hugh
Gaitskell who argued that the “bill will be regarded very largely throughout the world as
the imposition of a colour bar…” 31 He cautioned against restricting Commonwealth
migrants while opening the door to Europeans by entering the European Economic
Community, stating that it was a “very sad day for the Commonwealth” and that the true
28
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motive for the Bill was “colour and fear of racial disorder.” 32 Other liberals agreed in
terms of the racial bias and its certain effect on Commonwealth relations, thus urging the
Labour party to eliminate it at first chance. 33 But with Gaitskell’s death in January 1963,
Harold Wilson, now leading the Party, moved away from the opposing position, later that
year conceding that control was necessary and suggesting Labour’s position never
changed, as it was Tory methods of control they had opposed all along not the
Conservative position.
By the time the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was adopted in 1962 there were
already an estimated 400,000+ migrants from the West Indies, India and Pakistan living
in Great Britain. The government was primarily concerned with halting the flow of new
immigrants; by time action was taken, Britain was already a multicultural society. Some
suggest that it was the Act itself that created a multiracial society as it allowed for family
reunification and high quotas on new immigration. 34 Whether or not the clear influx if
immigration was due to the imminence of the Act is still a matter of debate, but the fact
remains that between 1940 and 1950, 211,640 people emigrated from India, Pakistan and
the Caribbean; during 1961 and the first half of 1962, before the Act came into force,
191,060 arrived on British shores. 35
The talk of restrictions and formation of control associations pushed the race and
immigration onto the public stage. A subject previously debated in Cabinet surgeries was
beginning to receive public attention. In their vigorous attempt to pressure party leaders,
political backbenchers were more apt to participate in editorial debates and make public
32
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statements, the content of which became more and more exaggerated and racially
charged.
In a meeting of the West Indian Immigrants Committee in December 1961, it was
stated that:
Since the public discussion of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill there
had undoubtedly been increased sensitivity amount West Indians, who
were worried about the likely attitude of their English neighbors. There
was a feeling that those people who were prejudiced against coloured
people might feel strengthened in their attitude by the Government
decision to introduce legislation. 36
Furthermore, the Commission had received reports of “West Indians having been insulted
in the streets and public houses,” and since the publication of the Bill there had also been
an increase in activity of organizations opposing colored immigration. It was reported
that the Commission had received a vast number of reports suggesting there was a
significant change in the attitude of police officers against West Indians; “there had been
many allegations of physical manhandling of West Indians by the police.” 37
Growing local tensions spurred civic-minded white residents to create Voluntary
Liaison Committees (VLCs) in many cities. With the aid of local churches and councils,
such organizations sought to assist immigrants to get settled in their new home. They
carried out a diverse set of functions including the delivery of juridical and social services
such as the administration of English classes. The committees had a paternalistic
conception of the welfare of immigrants, as they were primarily focused on explaining to
colored migrants how to conform to British society. At the time of creation, they were
neither efficient nor politically expedient. Generally run by volunteers, VLCs were
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marginal on the political scene in the 1940s and 1950s. They were generally ignored by
local councils, who had little to no interest. Some scholars of immigration politics favor
a Marxist-inspired argument that VLCs served to control minority populations and shield
them from local politicians, thus contributing to the non-politicization of racial issues,
while other suggest that the Committees contributed to the local attitude of benign
neglect that was present on the national scene. However, the VLCs did have a serious
impact on how the issue would be dealt with nationally in that they encouraged the
central government to see the problem as one that should be dealt with locally; there
presence in the 1940s and 1950s can in some ways be seen as placing racial issues on the
path of local politics rather than national. 38
Regardless of the actions and influence of Volunteer Liaison Committees and the
positions taken by the Conservative and Labour parties in order to marginalize race and
immigration, the issue exploded onto the national scene shortly after the introduction of
the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, mainly as a result of the shocking events that
occurred in the Midlands town of Smethwick. Determined to seize the parliamentary seat
that had been held by Labour for almost twenty years, the Conservative candidate, Peter
Griffiths, chose to run on an openly racist platform, tackling the colored immigration
issue outright. The nature of his campaign and the ultimate results would have a long and
lasting impact on race and immigration in British party politics.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SMETHWICK AND AFTER

I have come here to visit because I am disturbed by reports
that coloured people in Smethwick are being treated badly.
I have heard that they are being treated as the Jews under
Hitler. I wait for the fascist element in Smethwick to erect
gas ovens. -Malcolm X, February 1965

Immigration first entered the political scene in Smethwick during the local
elections of 1960 when a Conservative candidate for the Soho Ward ran on a policy of
evicting colored people from overcrowded houses without government responsibility to
assist in their relocation. Running on a racist platform, the Conservative almost won the
Labour seat at a time when Smethwick Tories, riding on their Party’s current fortunes,
gained four seats on the Smethwick Council and for the first time threatened the wellestablished Labour majority. Shortly after the 1960 campaign a series of disturbances
dubbed as ‘race riots’ broke out on the borders of Dudley and Smethwick, following
which a wave of letters on immigration began to appear in the local newspapers, the
publication of which continued almost unabated until the General Election of 1964.
In 1960 a long series of letters written by Lawrence Rieper, a retired bank officer
from Manchester, vehemently opposing colored immigration were published in the
Smethwick Telephone, a widely circulated local paper. The paper served as a vehicle to
spread racist propaganda, facilitating Rieper’s correspondence with Donald Finney, an
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engineer from Smethwick who joined Rieper in a long campaign violently opposed to the
settlement of colored people within Britain. In an effort to spark fear amongst the
Smethwick population, Finney included exaggerated and unsubstantiated statistics in his
letters. In February 1961 he wrote:
I wonder how many people realize that in 1951 we had 19 people known
to have leprosy and in 1959, the total jumped to 317 known sufferers in
England. In five years’ time, at the present rate immigrants are coming
into this country, I suppose it will be 1,000 with leprosy. In 1939 there
was no leprosy in England and tuberculosis had been stamped out. Now
our hospitals are full again. 1
One month later, at the request of a leading Birmingham councilor, Finney
announced the formation of a branch of the Birmingham Immigration Control
Association in Smethwick. Over three hundred people attended the committees first
meeting, with an excess of five hundred signing up in the weeks that followed. The
group organized the circulation of petitions calling for immigration control, ultimately
sending thousands of signatures to Cyril Osborne who was making similar efforts on the
national level. Pamphlets were assembled and circulated throughout the district calling
for individuals to ‘wake up’ and take action against the immigrant invasion.
Foot soldiers for the Smethwick branch canvassed the area en masse; their efforts
to spread propaganda were organized and extremely effective. Regardless of the veracity
of their claims, the average Smethwick resident could not tell the difference between fact
and fiction. Furthermore, the leap from real to fantastic was simple; propagandists turned
the reality that Asians were more prone to tuberculosis into the notion that all blacks
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spread dreadful diseases and spun the fact that immigrants resided in multi-occupied
slums into the idea that they ‘lived like cattle.’ 2
Events that occurred over the summer of 1961 supported the claims of the
Smethwick branch, bringing their cause into the national spotlight. After a ‘Korean war
veteran’ was evicted from a home owned and occupied by Indians, the organization
circulated a petition arguing that the man had been evicted simply because he was white.
Shortly after, the Labour-controlled council agreed to house a Pakistani whose home had
been demolished due to slum clearing. Residents of the area of relocation were outraged,
threatening to withhold rent should the colored immigrant be granted accommodation;
their efforts proved fruitless. Nonetheless, the events further provoked agitators, leading
to increased correspondence in the Smethwick Telephone; articles and letters addressing
the ‘Growing Colour Problem’ appeared on a regular basis. 3
Until that summer, the Smethwick branch had steered clear of party politics.
They trusted neither the Conservative nor the Labour party, believing both would
conform to any policy necessary to capture votes- even the colored vote. But as time
went on and it became clear that the Conservatives were moving towards the introduction
of restrictive legislation, the Association called for “an en bloc Labour resignation [in
order to] get Smethwick run by councilors who are servants of the people of
Smethwick.” 4 The organization’s newfound support for the Conservative party aroused
Labour leaders. Accusing the Smethwick branch of being directly connected with
Conservatives, Patrick Gordon Walker, the Labour Minister who had held Smethwick’s
seat for almost twenty years, refused to speak at a BICA engagement and following the
2
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introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, delivered a speech in opposition of
the Bill, further provoking the Association’s members.
In March of 1962 the Smethwick branch of the Immigration Control Association
was dissolved. Shortly after, Finney, Association founder and former leader officially
joined the Conservative party, joining forces with Peter Griffiths, a school teacher, leader
of council Conservatives, and Conservative Parliamentary candidate for the Smethwick
constituency. Griffiths was different from previous Conservative candidates in that he
was not a member of society’s higher echelons, but rather a ‘man of the people.’ He was
also a strong supporter of teacher’s unions, favored more schools, higher salaries, and
better benefits for the unemployed.
As Paul Foot argued, a common misconception about Griffiths is that he was a
political opportunist who adopted an anti-immigration stance once the political
advantages became evident. Prior to immigration becoming a significant political issue,
Griffiths took a stand in favor of restrictions, stating that:
Immigration into this country should be limited to persons of sound health
who have jobs and living accommodation arranged before they enter.
Preference should be given to persons holding British passports.
Immigrants should not be permitted to remain here without working, or to
overcrowd their housing accommodation. 5
Foot noted that this statement was made without provocation and in absence of any
electoral advantage. Griffiths’ interest in immigration as a political issue became evident
in 1961 when he led the Smethwick council in drafting a letter to Harold Gurden, MP for
Birmingham, in support of his demands for immigration control. After joining forces
with Finney in 1962, Griffiths began addressing the immigration issue in his weekly
political columns in the Smethwick Telephone, using the column to spread racial
5
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propaganda as well as attack his opposition, Patrick Gordon Walker, making such
statements as “We do not want another Varna Road in Smethwick” (a street in
Birmingham known for it’s prostitutes), that a single incident in Smethwick could result
in race riots, and “As our MP [addressing Gordon-Walker] you have been a dead loss- no
doubt you’ll get a medal from the West Indies.”6
The campaign slogan “If you want a nigger neighbour, vote Labour” appeared in
July 1963 when Gordon-Walker reported that school children had been organized to
chant the slogan. Griffiths’ responded that, “We can’t stop children reflecting the views
of their parents. The people of Smethwick certainly don’t want integration.” He went
onto tell The Times, “I would not condemn anyone who said that. I regard it as a
manifestation of popular feeling.” 7 Immigration had become the main theme of
Griffith’s campaign. He made statements about the moral dangers the presence of
Indians posed to white girls, saying that he had personally seen young ladies entering the
homes of such immigrants, called for a ten-year residential qualification for immigrants
displaced due slum clearance, and referred to colored residents as “Labour’s immigrant
friends.” In January 1964 he wrote that:
Apparently the plight of English children held back by the presence of
non-English speaking children in a class doesn’t bother the immigrant
leaders. Well, it bothers the Smethwick Tories and our kids are going to
get a square deal in spite of the combined opposition of the Socialists and
their immigrant friends. 8
In his official election address he wrote that:
I shall press for the strictest possible control of immigration. We British
must decide who shall or shall not enter our country. So vital a matter
cannot be left to other Governments. Overcrowding and dirty conditions
6
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must be ended. There must be no entry permits for criminals, the
unhealthy or those unwilling to work. Our streets must once again be safe
at night. 9
A campaign was also launched directly attacking Gordon Walker, spreading callous
rumors that he had sold his house to blacks, that he went to the West Indies to recruit
blacks, that his wife was black, and that all of his daughters had married blacks. Patrick
Gordon Walker responded that “Labour favours continued control of immigration,
stricter health checks and deportation of those convicted of criminal offences.” He
thought this simple statement may be enough to pacify his critics. 10
The people of Smethwick cast their votes on October 15, 1964. Peter Griffiths
defeated Patrick Gordon Walker with a swing of 7.3% to the Conservative party in a year
when the national average of 2.9% swung towards Labour. The shock was not so much
that Griffiths won, nor that race and immigration played such a prominent part in a
general election- such feelings towards the issues had been on the verge of eruption.
What was amazing was that the sentiment was expressed so openly. With the trickle of
Commonwealth immigration turning into a flood and former colonies such as Africa and
the Caribbean gaining political independence, the issues of race, nationalism, colonialism
and the end of Empire were certainly a part of the electoral agenda that year.
Furthermore, given the exposure to events in the southern United States and South Africa
through television news, Britons were undoubtedly more aware of current racial strife.
But although race was seen as an important issue, it had not been considered a
determining factor- until Smethwick.
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The Smethwick results raised the visibility of the race issue on a national level,
due solely to the vicious nature of the contest. Furthermore, the outcome confirmed antiimmigrant views that the public was behind their cause. More importantly, the outcome
had a resounding effect on both parties’ position, especially Labour, making it evident
that taking a racist position could, in fact, deliver electoral dividends. Anti-immigrant
candidates in Southall and Birmingham Perry Bar had done also well, sparking fear
within the Labour party and increasing the vulnerability of the new Labour government. 11
Newly elected Labour Prime Minster Harold Wilson accused Griffiths of
manipulating the race issue in order to gain a political advantage, describing the new
Conservative Member as a ‘parliamentary leper’ who would return to ‘oblivion; in the
next general election. In a public address he asked:
Is the Leader of the Opposition proud of hon. friend the Member for
Smethwick? Does he now intend to take him to his bosom? Will the
Conservative whip be extended to him, because if he does accept him as a
colleague he will make this clear; he will betray the principles which not
only his party but also his nation have hitherto had the right to proclaim. 12
Wilson’s direct attack on Griffith’s shocked many Conservative politicians, while the
leader of the Opposition’s refusal to comment on the Griffiths’ campaign angered Labour
Members.
Prior to the election, then Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home appeared on a
national broadcast where he responded to statements in which Griffiths where he claimed
that “Smethwick rejected the idea of being a multi-racial society” Douglas-Home
commented that “We should not indulge in statements of this kind… Every Conservative
candidate and certainly any member of the government and Conservative Party, would
11
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reject any feeling of racial discrimination and we should not indulge in this kind of
statement.” Griffiths responded with a comment in the Birmingham Evening Post,
stating that he “still believe[d] the people of Smethwick reject[ed] the idea of a multiracial society in the town.” The incident prompted Gordon Walker to draft a letter to
Douglas-Home addressing the nature of the Griffiths’ campaign asking the Prime
Minister to “repudiate specifically and publicly Alderman Griffiths repeated statement of
a view which [Douglas-Home]… said is in conflict with Conservative Party policy.” 13
In a Birmingham Post article published on 24 September 1964, Griffiths argued
that the:
Labour Party was stirring up ‘a most dangerous political situation’ and if
Socialist council returned to Smethwick in the next few years and gave
homes to those who had only been in slum clearance properties a few
months there would be immediate riots.
In response, Gordon Walker went on to write to the Prime Minister, “I also ask that you
disassociate yourself and your party from these remarks by Alderman Griffiths.” In the
Conservative Prime Minister response he stated, “I understand that Alderman Griffiths
has stated that he finds himself in entire with what I said. I do not, however, feel that a
problem of this sort is dealt with by public correspondence during a General Election
campaign.” He contemplated closing the letter with the statement, “I am sure you will
agree that it would be undesirable to risk making immigration a major national issue by
continuing the correspondence.” 14
The fact of the matter was that race and immigration had already surfaced on the
national scene. What Douglas-Home wanted to avoid was taking a clear stance on the
events unfolding in Smethwick. Furthermore, it was becoming evident that Griffiths may
13
14

PREM 11/ 4891, Patrick Gordon Walker to Alec Douglas-Home, 25 September 1964.
PREM 11/ 4891,Alec Douglas-home ot Patrick Gordon Walker, 27 September 1964.

53

win the electoral bid, thus Conservative leaders chose to ignore the Candidates extreme
positions in light of the fact that he was about to gain a seat held by Labour for the past
twenty years.
Two years later, Peter Griffiths was unseated by a well-known actor, disappearing
from political life until in 1979, he returned to Parliament representing Portsmouth North.
Holding the seat until 1997, his carried out the rest of his political career with great
caution, so much that the greater public did not realize he was the same “Peter Griffiths”
from the 1964 Smethwick campaign.
Following the 1964 election, in a period when race relations was as the forefront
of politics, Griffiths was not asked to become involved politically again. Nonetheless, his
campaign tactics had made it evident that playing the ‘race card’ could certainly equate to
electoral success. The events which unfolded from 1960 to 1964 in the small Midlands
town constitute what Foot called a “milestone in British politics.” Smethwick brought on
the first Conservative organization in the country that dared associate itself unequivocally
with anti-immigrant propaganda. Prior to 1960, the mass of Conservative statements
made in favor of multi-racialism had deterred such associations from doing so. More
importantly, by highlighting the electoral advantage of an anti-immigrant platform,
Griffiths and his 1964 campaign provided the Conservative Party with a political formula
to counter the electoral loyalty of the industrial working class to Labour. However limited
and temporary his success, Griffiths, by way of his own working class origins and
understanding that working class individuals were those most effected by immigration,
helped develop the same resonance of loyalty as experienced by the Labour Party. The
issue was used to gain the necessary working class votes; in a sense, by facing the issue
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straight on and taking a stance, the Smethwick Conservative accomplished what Labour
set out to do by means of avoiding the issue. 15
Recognizing potential political payoff, the majority of Shadow Cabinet decided to
move to the Right on the immigration issue. On 3 February 1965, Alec Douglas-Home
delivered a speech in which he called for tighter immigration control and evasion and a
government scheme to assist immigrants to return to their countries of origin. 16 Cyril
Osborne went on to introduce a motion calling for a ban on all future immigration into
Britain except for those whose parents or grandparents had been born in the country.
Peter Thorneycroft MP, then Shadow Home Secretary, approached Cyril Osborne with
the suggestion of a milder approach. The slightly toned-down motion – which still called
for deportation and repatriation – was debated on 2 March 1965; the entire Shadow
Cabinet marched into the same voting lobby in favor of ‘periodic and precise limits’ to
immigration. 17
Thus, the ideas which would produce the 1971 Bill were shaped immediately
following the Smethwick election. Griffiths “had thrown a primed grenade into the
parliamentary process” which would spark new debate; discussions previously avoided
and viewed as political poison were now deliberated in the open arena. 18
On 21 May 1965, Enoch Powell, MP and staunch supporter of immigration
control argued:
The opportunity of a person to enter this country from the Commonwealth
ought to be subject to exactly the same considerations, controls and
conditions as the opportunity of a person coming from anywhere else… It
is wholly absurd that while entry of aliens, whether from France or China,
15
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is controlled and policed with utmost efficiency, and permission to work,
and even more to settle is granted only with the greatest care and
circumspection, Commonwealth immigrants still stream in with little
surveillance and an absolute right to bring or fetch an unlimited number of
dependants.” 19
Nonetheless, the Conservative Party remained divided on the immigration issue.
The inadequacy of the 1962 election had become evident, highlighted by the introduction
of thirty one resolutions introduced at the 1965 Conservative Party calling for further
restrictions and ‘precise limits.’ 20 Three years after the implementation of the
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, Conservatives were still plagued by the same pressures
which motivated the move towards restriction in 1962.
The Labour Party faced their own set of challenges. Well aware if they adhered
to a strong pro-immigrant policy they were certain to alienate the working class, yet
fearful if they opted for further control they would lose the support of the socialistintellectual Left, Labour leaders realized the less they commented on the subject, the
better, hoping that an attempt to remove the issue from the political agenda may result in
less intense public opinion.
The 1964 Wilson Administration was faced with two unattractive alternativesthey must either tighten controls or risk being perceived as acting irresponsibly by a
significant section of the electorate. Labour leaders were well aware that the Smethwick
election made it quite evident that immigration could be a huge potential vote-loser if
seen as permitting a flood of additional immigrants to enter British cities. 21
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The Government chose a two-pronged approach, attempting to strengthen the
ineffective immigration controls enacted in 1962 while also moving to prevent
discrimination against immigrants already residing in Britain. Ultimately hoping to
remove the immigration issue from the minds of the British public, Labour’s actions
generated additional interest, as discussions of further limiting the entry of colored
immigrants and the possible introduction of criminal sanctions against anyone charged
with discriminating against a colored migrant made immigrant communities even more
visible to the greater British public. 22
In response to the politicization of race at Smethwick, the parties worked in a
bipartisan effort to extricate the issue from the political arena. Until 1975 leaders
followed an informal rule in which each party avoided all race-related subjects.
Whichever party was in control of government, they could expect the Opposition to
cooperate in this area to an extent rarely enjoyed on other subjects. For over a decade, the
Conservative and Labour parties joined in a truly bipartisan effort in terms of British race
policy.
The cooperation between the two parties was made evident through the
Conservative acceptance of the Race Relations Act of 1965, a hollow act outlawing
discrimination in public places, and their agreement with the general outline of the White
Paper proposing a reduction in the number of vouchers issued to Commonwealth
Immigrants. Alec Douglas-Home referred to the Labour initiatives as “sensible and very
fair;” 23 Norman St. John-Stevas, a Conservative Radical stated that both parties were in a
“broad area of agreement on this [immigration] question… We are all agreed on the need
22

John Carson “A Matter of Policy: The Lessons or Recent British Race Relations Legislation” (1976):
155.
23
Katznelson, op. cit., 149 in Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain, 38.

57

for control.” 24 It was obvious that by the end of 1965 there was clear party agreement in
the areas of race and immigration. Both parties had agreed- keep race out of party
politics- they did so simply by denying that such issues were politically relevant. 25
Before the Smethwick election of 1964, the Conservative and Labour parties
attempted to keep the immigration issue out of public politics in order to secure their
standing in the international arena. After the hostile and openly racist campaign led by
Griffiths, party leaders found it necessary to bury the issue once again. It was true that
taking a clear stance could result in an electoral advantage, but in gaining the support of
one faction, party leaders realized they would lose the votes of another, thus the parties
chose to work together to keep the race issue out of politics all together in an effort to
satisfy both ends of the electorate. They wanted to decrease immigration while also
appealing to the anti-discrimination lobby. By extricating the issue from public politics,
both governments were able to enact the necessary laws while avoiding the alienation of
any certain part of the British public.
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CONCLUSION

Between 1945 and 1965, race and immigration in British politics had gone full
circle. The bipartisan effort to keep the immigration issue out of the public gaze
immediately following the Second World War, launched in order to sustain Britain’s
imperial status and portray the United Kingdom as a newly enlightened force, began to
erode throughout the 1950s. As the importance of Empire diminished and discussions of
control increased, the issues of race and Commonwealth immigration formally confined
to Members’ surgeries began to spill over into the public arena. The 1958 incidents in
Nottingham and Notting Hill, deemed ‘race riots’ by the press, contributed to public
awareness, ultimately giving voice to political backbenchers who had opposed colored
immigration from the start.
By 1961, aware that could no longer keep pace with the American and Soviet
superpowers thus less concerned with international opinion or Commonwealth
preservation, the Conservative government found it an opportune time to introduce
restrictive legislation. While the Tories began to react to the strong lobby for
immigration control, Labour remained opposed, resulting in a crack in the bipartisan
effort established in the late 1940s. But before long, consensus reemerged, as both
parties wanted to avoid the issue from influencing electoral contests, though in an effort
to appeal to the a wider section of the electorate, a centrist faction of the Labour party
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emerged. Intent on keeping the immigration out of public politics, both parties remained
acutely aware of its significance, maneuvering in order to placate public opinion, but
even more so, attempting to manipulate public opinion in order to forward their cause.
The issue of colored immigration became a clear part of party politics in the 1964
Smethwick election. Not only did the Conservative candidate Peter Griffiths run an
openly racist campaign, but he managed to win running on a clear anti-immigrant
platform. Both parties were aware of the political expediency the race issue may
produce, but it was the Smethwick election that proved that the race and immigration
issues could be major vote-getter. While Conservative leaders did not issue official
support for Griffiths and his tactics, they also failed to condemn his actions. Party
leaders may not have agreed with his tactics, but chose to turn a blind eye in order to
capture the longstanding Labour seat.
But just as Smethwick demonstrated the electoral advantage that may be gained
by taking a strong stance against colored immigration, it was also clear that such a
position would alienate the Socialist-intellectual section of the electorate. Thus, in an
attempt to avoid alienating either faction, both parties reentered their unofficial, unspoken
bipartisan agreement to keep race and immigration out of party politics.
While the colored immigration issue had been stifled after 1965 by the bipartisan
agreement, the race issue would rear its ugly head again in 1968, when Enoch Powell
resurfaced as the populist leader of the charge against non-white immigration. He
believed the entry of colored migrants into Britain posed a serious threat to British
nationality and culture. He argued that the arrival of a large number of colored
immigrants and their tendency to congregate in concentrated areas in Britain would serve
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as a barrier to assimilation resulting in a ‘race problem’ the equivalent of which had taken
hold in the United States. He went on to lobby for a complete halt to all immigration and
the implementation of a plan to assist those black immigrants already settled in Britain in
returning to their native countries. 1
Powell and his views were launched onto the national scene with his infamous
‘river of blood’ speech delivered on 20 April 1968. Opposing the pending Race
Relations Bill, introduced two days later, he stated:
For these dangerous and divisive elements the legislation proposed in the
Race Relations Bill is the very pabulum they need to flourish. Here is the
means of showing that the immigrant communities can organize to
consolidate their members to agitate and campaign against their fellow
citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with legal weapons which
the ignorant and the ill-informed have provided. As I look ahead I am
filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I see ‘the River Tiber foaming
with much blood!’ That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we
watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is
interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, its coming
upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. 2
Powell’s speech made him the most popular Conservative politician. In four
opinion polls he recorded an average approval rating of seventy-five percent. 3 He
received a flood of letters and enormous support at rallies and demonstrations, exhibiting
the public frustration surrounding the bipartisan approach and dissatisfaction with antidiscrimination legislation.
The Labour government was enraged by Powell and his speech, believing the
bipartisan agreement had been broken. In order to disassociate the Conservative
1
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leadership from Powell’s views, he was removed from the Shadow Cabinet. It was not
the exact nature of his position that alienated Powell, but the fact that he expressed his
opinions publicly. After removing Powell, Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath
stated: “I have repeatedly emphasized that the policy of the Conservative party is that
immigration must be more stringently limited and that immigrants wishing to return to
their own countries should be helped to financially do so.” 4 Heath was angered at the
fact that Powell broke the established rule of silences. It became clear that Powell’s view
represented the large segment of the population that clearly opposed New
Commonwealth immigration, were angry over the decline of Britain’s imperial decline,
and frustrated that British politicians, in their bipartisan effort to keep the issues out of
the public eye, were, in fact, ignoring public interest.
Although removed from the Shadow Cabinet, Powell still had a lasting effect on
British politics. As a result of his speech, eighty constituency resolutions on immigration
were introduced at the annual Conservative conference. With the amount of support
Powell was receiving from within the Conservative party, combined with his
overwhelming public popularity, the Heath administration was forced to announce
tougher controls on immigration.
Smethwick was the ‘political earthquake’ that injected race onto the political
scene as, before the 1964 election, neither party could have guessed the extent to which it
would galvanize the political scene. With Smethwick the issue received a high political
profile from which it was difficult to retreat. The response of both parties was to attempt
to depoliticize race, a bipartisan effort that proved both self-serving and angering the
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electorate and party activists long-term. Nonetheless, Conservative and Labour leaders
had managed to create dilute the issue for a period of time, ultimately ensuring the
campaign tactics used at Smethwick would not resurface. With the exception of Enoch
Powell, both parties managed to impose the bipartisan agreement and marginalize the
issues of race and immigration for over a decade. 5
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